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Introduction
I have been asked by the Commission to address the following four questions in my
testimony:
The history of derivatives and derivatives market regulation;
The structure of the derivatives market at the start of the financial crisis;
How derivatives and derivatives markets functioned during the financial crisis;
The role of over the counter (―OTC‖) derivatives in the financial crisis,
distinguishing, if appropriate, between the role of credit derivatives and other
OTC derivatives, and the roles they may have played in amplifying and spreading
the crises.
I deal with these questions immediately below.
The History of Derivatives and Derivatives Market Regulation
The Early Derivatives Market. Beginning in 1865, farmers and grain merchants coalesced
in Chicago to hedge price risk in corn, wheat and other grains in what are thought to be the
earliest sustained derivatives transactions in this country. These kinds of derivatives have been
historically referred to as futures contracts.
Since their creation, these markets were recognized as being subject to price distortion
(i.e., rather than providing hedging, they can cause payments of unnecessary and unexpected
higher or lower spot prices) through excessive speculation, fraud, or manipulation. As one
disgruntled farmer told the House Agriculture Committee in 1892: ―[T]he man who managed or
sold or owned those immense wheat fields has not as much to say with the regard to the price of
the wheat than some young fellow who stands howling around the Chicago wheat pit could
actually sell in a day.‘‖1
The Origins and Purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act. Because low farm prices wrecked
financial havoc on America‘s agriculture sector during the Depression, President Roosevelt
recommended to Congress, as one of his earliest market reform proposals, legislation that became
the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936. When introducing this legislation in 1934, President
Roosevelt said: ―[I]t should be our national policy to restrict, as far as possible, the use of these
[futures] exchanges for purely speculative operations.‖2 Accordingly, the 1935 Report of House
Agriculture Committee stated: ―The fundamental purpose of the measure [i.e., what was to become
the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (―CEA‖)] is to insure fair practice and honest dealing on the
commodity exchanges and to provide a measure of control over those forms of speculative activity

1

Jonathan Ira Levy, Contemplating Delivery: Futures Trading and the Problem of Commodity Exchange in the
United States, 1875-1905, AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 307 (2006)(quoting Fictitious Dealings in Agricultural
Products: House Comm. on Agric. Committee Hearing Reports (1892)).
2
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress, February 9, 1934.

which too often demoralize the markets to the injury of producers and consumers and the exchanges
themselves.‖3
Thus, the Commodity Exchange Act (―CEA‖), as amended, required that all futures
contracts be traded on a regulated exchange providing full transparency to trading behavior and
the formation of futures prices.4 The exchange trading requirement of the CEA was so central to
that statute‘s policy that it is still a felony to knowingly violate it and substantial fines may be
levied upon offending dealers and their employees.5
The Nature of Futures Contracts. ―The traditional futures contact is an agreement
between a seller and a buyer that the seller (called a short) will deliver to the buyer (called a
long), at a price agreed to when the contract is first entered, and the buyer will accept and pay
for, a specified quantity and grade of an identified commodity in the future.‖6
While futures contracts were first developed for the agriculture sector, it expanded into
metals and energy products. ―[T]here has been a continual [further] expansion of the futures and
derivatives market [to] [f]inancial futures – on government securities, private debt issues, foreign
currencies and stock indexes – an increasingly important part of the commodities world.‖7
―Standardization of terms is a key feature of publicly traded futures contracts. Under a
futures contract, most customers do not expect to take delivery.…There is an opportunity to
offset, and the customer has a right to liquidate rather than take [or make] delivery.‖8 Only
through the use of highly standardized products can the necessary liquidity be developed that
allows traders the much needed ability to offset quickly delivery commitments in order to avoid
unwanted delivery obligations.
One more recent accepted method of ―avoiding delivery‖ is to ―cash settle‖ the futures
transaction based on the market price of the futures contract, a settlement process which has been
deemed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (―CFTC‖) to be wholly permissible
under the CEA.9
The Contours of the Exchange Trading Requirement. As would be expected of a market
regulation bill that followed in the wake of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, the contours of
futures exchange regulation closely mirrored the regulation of the equities markets, i.e., futures
contracts were required to be traded on publicly transparent and fully regulated exchanges
supported by clearing mechanisms that ensure contractual commitments would be backed by
adequate capital.10
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Report No. 421, U.S. House of Representatives 74th Cong, Accompanying the Commodity Exchange Act, March
18, 1935 (emphasis added).
4
7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2009).
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Id. § 13(b).
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Phillip Mc Bride Johnson and Thomas Lee Hazen, DERIVATIVES REGULATION, §1.02[3] at 25 (Aspen, 2004)
(hereinafter DERIVATIVES REGULATION).
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Under the CEA specifically, regulated exchanges insured that futures contracts were
subject to: (1) public and transparent pricing based on market demand; (2) disclosure of the real
trading parties in interest to the federal government; (3) regulation of intermediaries; i.e., brokers
and their employers; (4) stringent rules for customer protection; (5) self regulation by exchanges
directly supervised by a federal regulator to detect unlawful trading activity; (6) prohibitions
against fraud, market manipulation and excessive speculation; and (7) enforcement of all these
requirements by the federal regulator, private individuals and the states through private rights of
action and state parens patriae suits, respectively.
As an integral part of this regulatory format, futures contracts also had to be cleared, i.e.,
a well capitalized and regulated intermediary institution was required to stand between the
counterparties of a futures contract to ensure that commitments undertaken pursuant to those
contracts were adequately capitalized through the collection of margin.11 Any contractual failure
was guaranteed by the clearing facility, a financial commitment that served to insure that the
clearing facility had a great incentive to strictly enforce the capital adequacy of traders through
highly disciplined assessment of the market price of the futures position and immediate
collection of initial margin upon executing the futures trade and of variation margin as the
contract price moves against a counterparty to the trade.12
The Development and Characteristics of Swaps. By the 1980‘s, a variant of futures
contracts was developed, commonly referred to as ―swaps‖.13 When first addressing ―swaps‖
contracts, the CFTC defined them as ―an agreement between two parties to exchange a series of
cash flows measured by different interest rates, exchanges rates, or prices with payment
calculated by reference to a principal base (notional amount).‖14 Similarly, the International
Swaps Derivatives Association (―ISDA‖) defines a ―swap‖ as ―[a] derivative where two
counterparties exchange streams of cash flows with each other. These streams are known as the
―legs‖ of the swap and are calculated by reference to a notional amount.‖15
A classic example of an interest rate swap transaction is where one party to the agreement
exchanges a floating interest rate obligation on an existing loan for a fixed rate obligation to be
paid by a swaps dealer or by another counterparty to which the swap has been assigned by the
swaps dealer. Usually, the person swapping the floating rate for a fixed rate is expecting (or
hedging against the fact) that the fixed rate will be lower than the floating rate.
In other words, the loan is usually neither negotiated nor renegotiated under the swap. It
is an assumed amount written into the swap, most often reflecting an actual outstanding loan of
one of the swaps customers from a creditor or lender upon which a floating rate is being paid to
the lender. The fixed interest rate payments paid by the swaps dealer to the borrower would also
be specified in the transaction, as would the manner in which the floating rate would be
calculated. Thus, rather than buying/selling a single future rate or price (as would be true in a
traditional futures contract), there is a ―swapping‖ of commitments with one party buying the
11

See id. § 1.18.
See id. § 1.18.
13
See DERIVATIVES REGULATION § 102[12A] at 29-30 (Supp. 2010).
14
54 Fed. Reg. 30694 (July 21, 1989).
15
DCG Glossary, International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. website, available at
http://www.isda.org/c_and_a/oper_commit-dcg-glossary.html (last visited June 27, 2010).
12
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fixed rate and selling the floating rate while the other party is buying the floating rate and selling
the fixed rate.
Swaps and the CEA‟s Exchange Trading Requirement. After ―swaps‖ contracts had been
developed by the banks/dealers in the 1980s, with a simultaneous recognition that ―swaps‖
contained all the features of a futures contract, the question arose whether swaps would be
subject to the mandatory exchange trading requirement of the CEA. In a 1989 Policy Statement,
the CFTC set forth the criteria for the kind of swaps for ―which regulation under the CEA and
Commission regulations [of swaps would be] unnecessary.‖16 The CFTC recognized that swaps
at that time required:
―[t]ailoring . . . through private negotiations between the parties and may
involve not only financial terms but issues such as representations,
covenants, events of default, term to maturity and any requirement for the
posting of collateral or other credit enhancement. Such tailoring and
counterparty credit assessment distinguish swap transactions from
exchange transactions, where the contract terms are standardized and the
counterparty is unknown.‖17
Accordingly, the CFTC exempted swaps from the CEA exchange trading requirement by stating
that ―swaps must be negotiated by the parties as to their material terms, based upon
individualized credit determinations, and documented by the parties in an agreement or series of
agreements that is not fully standardized.‖18 Another condition of the exchange trading
exemption is that ―[t]he swap must not be marketed to the public.‖19
Because the CEA provided no explicit provision authorizing the CFTC to grant an
exemption from the CEA‘s exchange trading requirement such as that found in the CFTC‘s 1989
Policy Statement, swaps dealers/banks contended that there was ―uncertainty‖ as to the legal
effect of that policy statement. Thus, Congress in 1992 passed the Futures Trading Practices Act
(―FTPA‖), adding a new § 4(c)(5)(b) to the CEA which authorized the precise criteria for the
CFTC to create exemptions from the CEA‘s mandatory exchange trading requirement for, inter
alia, ―swaps agreements,‖ which ―are not part of a fungible class of agreements that are
standardized as to their material economic terms…‖20
The Commission later explained this statutory bar to standardization of swaps
transactions as follows: ―This condition [that swaps be individually negotiated] is designed to
assure that the exemption does not encompass . . . swap agreements, the terms of which are fixed
and are not subject to negotiation, that functions essentially in the same manner as an exchange
but for the bilateral execution of transactions.‖21
Pursuant to the CFTC‘s ability to grant exceptions to the CEA‘s exchange trading
requirement authorized by the 1992 FTPA, the CFTC by rule in 1993 provided an exception
16

54 Fed. Reg. 30694 (July 21, 1989).
Id. (emphasis added).
18
Id.
19
DERIVATIVES REGULATION § 1.02[5] at 43.
20
Pub. L. No. 102-546.
21
58 Fed. Reg. 5587 (Jan. 22, 1993) (emphasis added).
17
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from the CEA‘s exchange trading requirement for those swaps that were, inter alia, ―not part of a
fungible class of agreements that are standardized as to their material economic terms[.]‖22
Moreover, exempt swaps agreements were not to be ―traded on or through a multilateral
transaction execution facility.‖23 In laymen‘s terms, ―a multilateral transaction execution
facility‖ consists of one party offering electronically a swaps agreement to many different other
parties, rather than merely offering agreements on a bilateral or one-on-one basis.
The Standardization of Swaps Through the ISDA Master Agreement. However, even
before the 1993 CFTC rule calling for negotiation of each of the material economic terms of
swap was promulgated, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (known then as the
International Swaps Dealers Association) in 1992 created a standardized and copyrighted Master
Agreement and related schedule to govern the execution of a swap. ISDA ―was chartered in 1985
and today has over 825 member institutions.‖24
The ISDA Master Agreement is 18 pages long with standardized, boilerplate clauses, and
each page carries with it a copyright in ISDA‘s name. It includes the fundamental provisions
without which the swaps transaction could not be understood. Included among the many
contractual points resolved by the ISDA Master Agreement are ―interpretation‖ principles (¶ 1);
―obligations‖, including ―liability‖ (¶2); ―representations‖ (¶3); ―agreements‖ (¶4); ―events of
default and termination events‖ (¶5); ―early termination‖ (¶6); ―transfer‖ (¶7); ―contractual
currency‖ (¶8); ―remedies‖ (¶9); ―expenses‖ (¶11); ―notice‖ (¶12); ―governing law and
jurisdiction‖ (¶13); and forty three ―definitions‖ governing the swaps transactions (¶14).
Accompanying the ISDA Master Agreement is a ―Schedule,‖ which is thirteen pages
long, derived directly from a standardized ISDA template for that ―Schedule,‖ which, in turn,
provides a standardized menu of limited choices to further define terms of the ISDA Master
Agreement. The ISDA template for the Schedule is itself copyrighted on every page in ISDA‘s
name. The ISDA standardized template for the Schedule is dependent upon, and references only,
the ISDA Master Agreement.
Accompanying the ISDA Schedule is a standardized ISDA Credit Support Annex, which
is sixteen pages long and also includes copyrights in ISDA‘s name on every page except those
relating to the last of thirteen paragraphs. The first twelve paragraphs within the ISDA Credit
Annex are standardized boilerplate written by ISDA. Every page is once again copyrighted in
ISDA‘s name. Only the last paragraph concerning ―elections and variables‖ is not standardized.
The CFTC‟s May 1998 Concept Release. By 1998, the over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives market was growing at a rapid pace. As the CFTC noted:
―Use of OTC derivatives has grown at very substantial rates over the past few years.
According to the most recent market survey by [ISDA], the notional value of new
transactions reported by ISDA members in interest rate swaps, currency swaps, and
interest rate options during the first half of 1997 increased 46% over the previous six22

17 C.F.R. § 35.2(b) (2009).
Id. at § 35.2(d).
24
Eraj Shirvani New Chairman of ISDA, News Release, April 16, 2008, available at
http://www.isda.org/.
23
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month period. The notional value of outstanding contracts in these instruments was
$28.733 trillion, up 12.9% from year-end 1996, 62.2% from year-end 1995, and 154.2%
from year-end 1994. ISDA's 1996 market survey noted that there were 633,316
outstanding contracts in these instruments as of year-end 1996, up 47% from year-end
1995, which in turn represented a 40.7% increase over year-end 1994. . . .‖25
Also, these OTC derivatives were now, because of the ISDA Master Agreement, so
standardized that they could be traded electronically on a multilateral basis, thereby exhibiting all
of the trading characteristics of traditional exchange traded standardized futures contracts.26
Because swaps were increasingly standardized and traded multilaterally, however, the market
was not within the ―safe harbors‖ exemption from the CEA regulatory requirements and
protections of the CEA provided by the 1989 Swaps Policy Statement or the 1993 Swaps
exemption.
On May 7, 1998, the CFTC promulgated a ―concept release‖ on ―OTC Derivatives,‖
finding that these standardized products were almost certainly subject to the mandatory exchange
trading requirement (and therefore were trading in violation of law) and calling for public
comment on the development of various alternative regulatory features that would create an § 4
(c) exemption from the CEA‘s mandatory exchange trading.27
Any new regulatory system would be applied ―prospectively,‖ with the existing market
retroactively sanctioned under the CEA.28 The public was asked to answer a series of questions
pertaining to what, if any, of the features of a fully regulated exchange trading requirement
should be applied to the swaps market, e.g., reporting and disclosure, capital adequacy, clearing,
exchange trading, regulation of intermediaries, self regulation or application of anti-fraud and
anti-manipulation principles. The CFTC expressly stated that it had no preconceived notion of
the answer to these questions.
Pre-1998 Swaps Market Dysfunctions. The motivation for this May 1998 CFTC inquiry
was the fact that unregulated swaps had caused so many financial calamities. The CFTC noted:
―A number of large, well publicized, financial losses over the last few years have
focused the attention of the financial services industry, its regulators, derivatives endusers, and the general public on potential problems and abuses in the OTC derivatives
market. Many of these losses have come to light since the last major regulatory actions by
the CFTC involving OTC derivatives, the swaps and hybrid instruments exemptions
issued in January 1993.‖29
In footnote 6 of the concept release, the CFTC cited ―Jerry A. Markham, Commodities
Regulation: Fraud, Manipulation & Other Claims, Section 27.05 nn. 2-22.1 (1997) (listing 22

25

63 Fed. Reg. 26114, 26115 (May 12, 1998) available at
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opamntn.htm#p60_8020.
26
See 63 Fed. Reg. 26114 (May 12, 1998).
27
Id.
28
Id. at 26114.
29
Id. at 26114, 26115.

6

examples of significant losses in financial derivatives transactions) [and] a 1997 GAO Report 4
(stating that the GAO identified 360 substantial end-user losses).‖
The most prominent scandals deriving from swaps by May 1998 included the1994
bankruptcy of Orange County, the largest municipal default in the Nation‘s history. Orange
County was one the country‘s wealthiest and fifth most populous. Having executed many
poorly understood interest rate swaps, the county suddenly found itself facing massive debt as
interest rates quickly rose. It lost approximately $1.6 billion.30 Merrill Lynch agreed to pay
$400 million to Orange County to settle claims involving the derivatives that caused Orange
County's bankruptcy.
Also beginning in 1994, two large corporate clients of Bankers Trust, Gibson Greetings
and Procter & Gamble, successfully sued it for defrauding them in the sale of complicated
unregulated derivatives, thereby causing large customer losses. Central to that litigation success
were over 6500 tape recordings of Bankers Trust employees acknowledging to each other that
the bank‘s clients did not understand the adverse impact the derivatives transactions would have
on them.
The SEC and CFTC took cooperative enforcement against Bankers Trust for violating the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities and commodities laws in connection with OTC
derivatives it marketed.31 The SEC found that Bankers Trust violated various sections of the
securities laws, including making false statements or omissions in the sale of securities,
supplying materially inaccurate valuations of derivatives transactions, and failing to supervise
marketing personnel.32 The CFTC asserted that Bankers Trust, by its conduct, had assumed the
role of a commodity trading advisor and had violated the antifraud provisions of the CEA
governing such parties‘ activities.33
Opposition to the CFTC Concept Release. The CFTC‘s sister agencies (the Treasury, the
Fed, and the SEC) within the President‘s Working Group were strongly opposed to the CFTC‘s
concept release inquiry.34 In response to a request from the remaining members of the
President‘s Working Group on Financial markets issued on the very day the concept release was
published, Congress eventually enacted a six month statutory moratorium to the CFTC concept
release.35
The LTCM Crisis. However, in September 1998, Long-Term Capital Management
(―LTCM‖), which was up until that time the country‘s largest and most successful hedge fund,
nearly collapsed from the loss over a period of weeks $4.6 billion (or about 90% of its capital) on
losses from, inter alia, OTC derivatives positions. It was feared that LTCM‘s failure would have
30

Mark Baldassare, WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY BANKRUPTCY 2-3 (1998).
U.S. Gov‘t Accountability Office, OTC Derivatives: Additional Oversight Could Reduce Costly Sales Practice
Disputes 8 (1997).
32
Id. at 44.
33
Id. at 45-46.
34
Frontline: The Warning (PBS television broadcast Oct. 20, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/warning/etc/script.html).
35
See President‘s Working Group on Financial Markets, Over-the-Counter Market and the Commodities Exchange
Act (1999) at 13 (hereinafter ―PWG 1999 OTC Report‖).
31
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created failure of many of its counterparties which were the hedge fund‘s OTC derivative
counterparties and creditors, including some of the world‘s largest financial institutions. So
concerned were those financial institutions about the systemic effect of LTCM‘s failure that,
under the auspices of the New York Federal Reserve, on September 23, 1998 (with just about 48
hours of notice about LTCM‘s potential collapse) fourteen of those institutions contributed a
total of $3.6 billion to buy out the fund to keep it from failing. 36
The President‟s Working Group‟s 1999 Report on LTCM. After a full day of hearings
before the House Financial Services Committee on October 1, 1998 on the LTCM crisis, the
President‘s Working Group was asked to prepare a report on the LTCM failure and actions that
might be recommended to prevent such a potentially systemic failure in the future. In April 1999,
the PWG issued that report. It noted that: ―The near collapse of [LTCM] highlighted the
possibility that problems at one financial institution could be transmitted to other institutions, and
potentially pose risks to the financial system.‖37
One of the major recommendations of the April 1999 PWG report was that the SEC, the
CFTC and the Treasury receive expanded authority to require OTC derivative counterparties to
provide credit risk information, recordkeeping and reporting and data on concentrations, trading
strategies and risk models, as well as the ability to inspect risk management models.38 Fed
Chairman Greenspan declined to endorse this set of recommendations, but deferred to those
regulators with supervisory authority.39
The Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group Report on the LTCM Crisis. Shortly
after the LTCM episode, twelve of the world‘s largest banks formed the Counterparty Risk
Management Policy Group (―CRMPG‖) to conduct a self study of practices that led to the
LTCM crisis and to recommend self regulatory practices that would prevent such an episode
from reoccurring. In June 1999, CRMPG issued a detailed 57 page report, which acknowledged
faulty supervision of OTC swaps‘ desks within their institutions and promised a broad array of
management practices, including improved supervision and reporting and market practices
pertaining to OTC derivatives. Included within CRMPG‘s recommendations was a commitment
to meet informally and periodically with their primary regulator to discuss OTC ―market trends
and conditions,‖ including providing reports ―detailing certain large exposure information on a
consolidated basis group.‖40
Illustrative of a problem that would reoccur in these markets is an observation about the
lack of proper documentation of OTC derivatives transactions. CRMPG states: ―The global
financial markets operate through an interconnected series of contracts among market
participants. . . .Although written documents may not be, per se, necessary to establish a contract,
they are the best evidence of the terms of a contract and the best way to ensure that parties agree

36

Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management, Report of the President‘s Working
Group on Financial Markets (April 1999) 10 -17.
37
Id. viii.
38
Id. 39-40.
39
Id. 39, note 23.
40
―Improving Counterparty Risk Management Practices,‖ Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, June 1999
10-11 available at http://www.isda.org/educat/pdf/CRMPG-Report6-99.pdf.
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on the specific terms of a transaction. Failure to document a transaction appropriately or
expeditiously, therefore, creates risk. . . .‖41
The 1999 PWG Report Recommending Deregulation of Swaps. The major thrust of the
CRMPG report was to oppose ―new regulation . . .It would be a mistake to attempt to codify risk
management practices in that fashion.‖42 Not only were no new regulations promulgated (nor
were the informal meetings with regulators initiated proposed by CRMPG ever initiated), by
November 1999, the PWG (in a seeming reversal from its April 1999 Report) was
recommending to Congress that financial OTC derivatives totally be deregulated. In a cover
letter for that report, then Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers explained:
―Over-the-counter derivatives have transformed the world of finance, increasing the
range of financial products available to corporations and investors and fostering more
precise ways of understanding, quantifying, and managing risk. These important markets
are large and growing rapidly. At the end of 1998, the estimated notional value of OTC
derivative contracts was $80 trillion, according to the Bank for International Settlements.
In addition, these global markets have been marked by innovation in products and trading
and settlement mechanisms.
A cloud of legal uncertainty has hung over the OTC derivatives markets in the United
States in recent years, which, if not addressed, could discourage innovation and growth of
these important markets and damage U.S. leadership in these arenas by driving
transactions off-shore. . . .‖
The central and key recommendation within the PWG 1999 Report with respect to ―OTC
derivatives‖ was that Congress provide ―[a]n exclusion from the CEA [―s regulatory
requirements] for bilateral transactions between sophisticated counterparties (other than
transactions that involve non-financial commodities with finite supplies) . . .‖43
The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000‟s Deregulation of Swaps.
Accordingly, on December 15, 2000, Congress passed and on December 21, 2000, President
Clinton signed into law the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (―CFMA‖).44 The
CFMA removed OTC derivatives transactions, including energy futures transactions, from all
requirements of exchange trading and clearing under the CEA so long as the counterparties to the
swap were ―eligible contract participants‖. Generally speaking, a counterparty to be an ―eligible
contract participant‖ had to have in excess of $10 million in total assets with some limited
exceptions allowing lesser amounts in the case of an individual using the swap for risk
management purposes.45
Thus, the OTC derivatives market (at that time according to Secretary Summers
amounting to $80 trillion notional value) was exempt from the CEA‘s capital adequacy

41

Id. 37 (emphasis added).
Id. 2
43
PWG OTC Report 1999 Report at 2.
44
Public Law 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763.
45
DERIVATIVES REGULATION, § 1.18[5] at 328-29 (2004 ed.)
42
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requirements; reporting and disclosure; regulation of intermediaries; self regulation; any bars on
fraud, manipulation46 and excessive speculation; and requirements for clearing.
The SEC was similarly barred from OTC derivatives oversight except for the limited
fraud jurisdiction it maintained over securities-based swaps. During the TARP hearings in
September 2008, then-SEC Chairman Christopher Cox warned Congress about the need for
―immediate legislative action,‖ because he viewed OTC credit derivatives market as a
―regulatory blackhole.‖47
Recognizing that the deregulation of swaps would remove the Act‘s bar against excessive
speculation in regulated exchange traded futures, the CFMA also expressly preempted state
gaming and anti-bucket shop laws,48 which would have barred the otherwise unregulated
speculative activity authorized by the CFMA.
Finally, to ensure that not even the CFMA itself could be used as a basis to challenge the
legality of a swap, the Act provides that ―[n]o agreement, contract, or transaction between
eligible contract participants . . .shall be void, voidable, or unenforceable . . .based solely on the
failure . . . to comply with . . .this Act . . .‖49
Conclusions about the Deregulatory Effect of the CFMA. In sum, what was then
estimated to be this multi-trillion dollar OTC derivatives market was removed from almost all
pertinent federal and state enforcement to which trading markets had been subject since the New
Deal, as well as a central premise of the common law of contracts, i.e., that illegal contracts are
subject to a declaration of unenforceability. In effect, almost no law applied to this market.

46

Unlike financial swaps, which were ―excluded‖ from the exchange trading requirement, including fraud and
manipulation prohibitions, energy and metals swaps, while relieved of the exchange trading, continued to be subject
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Credit Default Swaps and the Economic Meltdown in the Fall of 2008
The Swaps Market in the Fall of 2008. In October 2008, the notional value of the
unregulated OTC market was estimated to be in excess of $ 600 trillion.50 Included within that
amount was estimated to somewhere between $35-65 trillion in credit default swaps (―CDSs‖).51
While the Federal Reserve has estimated generally that 3% of the notional amount of a
swap is the amount at risk in swaps transactions, a credit default swaps‘ insurance like aspects
mean that if a default is triggered, the entire amount of the sum guaranteed is at risk. While the
Federal Reserve‘s 3% figure establishing amount at risk has been deemed by many (including
me) to be far too low, combining even the lower figure for the value of outstanding CDS ($35
trillion) in September 2008 with Fed‘s 3% of the remaining notional value ($565 trillion), the
resulting amount at risk at the time of the meltdown (about $52 trillion) almost equaled the
world‘s GDP. Even using the most conservative figures for the sake of argument, $52 trillion is
a very large figure.
Widespread Recognition That CDS Played Key Role in the Meltdown. It is now almost
universally accepted that the unregulated multi-trillion dollar OTC CDS market helped foment a
mortgage crisis, then a credit crisis, and finally a ―once-in-a-century‖ systemic financial crisis
that, but for huge U.S. taxpayer interventions, would have in the fall of 2008 led the world
economy into a devastating Depression. Before explaining below the manner in which credit
default swaps fomented this crisis, it worth citing in the margin those many economists,52
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regulators,53 market observers,54 and financial columnists55 who have described the central role
unregulated CDS played in the crisis.
Even those once skeptical of arguments about the dangers of OTC derivatives have
joined this chorus. In warning Congress about badly-needed financial regulatory reform efforts
when it considered the TARP legislation in Senate hearings before the Senate Banking
Committee in September, 2008, then-SEC Chairman Christopher Cox called the CDS market a
―regulatory blackhole‖ in need of ―immediate legislative action.‖56 Former SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt and even former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan—both of whom supported the CFMA
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in 2000—have acknowledged that the deregulation of the CDS market contributed to the fall
2008 economic downfall.57
The Pre-meltdown Actions on CDS of the NY Fed and the Counterparty Risk
Management Policy Group. Moreover, important actions taken by regulators and market
participants in the prior years running up to the meltdown further indicate the central role that
credit derivatives were to play in causing the meltdown. For example, in September 2005, then
New York Fed President Timothy Geithner summoned representatives of 14 of the world‘s
largest banks, expressing concerns about substantial backlogs in the documentation of credit
derivatives. He asked the banks to clear up 80% of the backlog within a year. One report
concerning Geithner‘s concerns stated: ―Though transactions become legally binding once
agreed to over the telephone, regulators are concerned that the backlog of confirmations would
become an operational nightmare if credit markets were rocked by, for example, a series of
corporate defaults.‖ 58
Geithner also asked the banks ―to form a clearing house for trillions of dollars in
complicated derivatives contracts.‖59 Within a year the banks were able to claim that 94% of the
backlog in credit derivatives had been erased.60 However, Geithner‘s call for the development of
a clearing mechanism was not adopted prior to the 2008 meltdown.61
The swaps dealers‘ self study organization – CRMPG – also issued two reports in July
2005 and July 2008, making it clear that there were internal concerns about the viability of the
credit derivative market. The former report highlighted problems in the trading of those OTC
derivatives, including the frequent assignment to institutions not part of the original deal that
made it hard to know who the CDS counterparties were, especially in an era of poor transaction
documentation.62 The 2005 report also sounded the ominous note that the financial services
industry ―has very limited experience with settling large numbers of transactions‖ following a
significant credit default.63 The 2008 CRMPG report expressed sufficient concern about credit
derivative settlement processes that it ―urge[d] swift industry action to create a clearinghouse for
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OTC derivatives, starting with CDS.‖64 This was certainly an internal industry acknowledgement
that all was not well with the CDS market at that time.
How CDS Were Used to Undermine the Subprime Market. I know that this Commission
has already studied with care the securitization process as it related to the meltdown. What must
be understood now is the manner in which the CDS market heightened substantially risks posed
by securitization. In brief, the securitization of subprime mortgage loans evolved to embed
simple mortgage backed securities (―MBS‖) within highly complex collateralized debt
obligations (―CDOs‖). As this Commission well knows, these CDOs constituted the pulling
together and dissection into ―tranches‖ of huge numbers of MBS, theoretically designed to
diversify and offer gradations of risk to those who wished to invest in subprime mortgages.
However, investors became unmoored from the essential risk underlying loans to noncredit worthy individuals by the continuous reframing of the form of risk (e.g., from subprime
mortgages to MBS to CDOs); the false assurances given by credit rating agencies that were
misleadingly high evaluations of the CDOs; and, most importantly, by the purported ―insurance‖
offered on CDOs in the form of CDSs as a seeming safety net to these risky investments.
How CDS Worked. The CDS ―swap‖ was the exchange by one counterparty of a
―premium‖ for the other counterparty‘s ―guarantee‖ of the financial viability of a CDO. While
CDSs have all the hallmarks of insurance, issuers of CDSs in the insurance industry, specially
the bond insurers (―monolines‖) enticed into underwriting CDS, were urged by swaps dealers
not to refer to it as ―insurance‖ out of a fear that CDSs would be subject to insurance regulation
by state insurance commissioners, which would have included, inter alia, strict capital adequacy
requirements.65 By using the term ―swaps,‖ CDSs fell into the regulatory ―blackhole‖ afforded
by the CFMA‘s ―swaps‖ exclusion (Section 2 (g)) because no federal agency had direct
supervision over, or even advance knowledge of, what went on in the private, bilateral world of
―swaps.‖
The CFMA Eliminated All Fail Safes for CDS. Accordingly, all of the ―fail safes‖ that
apply to the regulated equities market and that had applied to the regulated futures markets were,
by virtue of the CFMA, turned off at the time of the meltdown. There were no clearing
requirements to ensure that CDS commitments were adequately capitalized. There were no
exchange trading requirements, which would have allowed the market to regularly and
transparently price these assets; rather than leaving such pricing to the highly contentious
mathematical algorithms that constitute the disputatious mark to model system of pricing.
There were also no recordkeeping and reporting requirements, the latter of which might
have, in and of themselves, sent signals to prudential and market regulators that systemically
64
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risky institutions were without adequate capital underwriting trillions of dollars of insurance
while wholly underpricing the risk of the underwriting.
The lack of recordkeeping and reporting also prevented fraud enforcement – had fraud
enforcement itself not been banned for CDS by the CFMA. The lack of reporting also blinded
regulators to the scope of the problems caused by underfunded CDS commitments, leaving them
guessing as to the reality of the situation and adopting (perhaps correctly) a worst case scenario
of defaults and resulting systemic risk.
Again, because CDS were deemed neither insurance nor an instrument otherwise
regulated by the federal government, issuers were not required to set aside adequate capital
reserves to stand behind the guarantee of CDOs.
The Motivations for Underwriting Subprime CDS. The issuers of CDSs were almost
certainly beguiled by the utopian view (supported by ill considered mathematical algorithms)
that housing prices would always go up. They believed that even a borrower who could not
afford a mortgage at initial closing would soon be able to extract the constantly appreciating
value in the residence to refinance and pay mortgage obligations. Under this utopian view, the
writing of a CDS was deemed to be ―risk free‖ with a goal of writing as many CDSs as possible
to develop what was considered to be the huge risk free cash flow from the CDS ―premiums.‖
Unfortunately, when housing prices collapsed and defaults were triggered, it was clear that the
premiums vastly underpriced the huge risk undertaken.
CDS Encourage Subprime Investments. Again, because there was thought to be insurance
to place a floor under what certainly must have seemed to some investors a risky bet on the
success of mortgages to non-credit worthy lenders, that false confidence certainly fed the flames
of investment in the subprime securitization process. In other words, each investment in a CDO
was thought to be protected by insurance on that investment. Accordingly, there was a higher
demand for the mortgages and mortgage backed securities that fed the CDO. Because of the lack
of transparency, regulators could not observe the phenomena that the MDS CDO frenzy was
sparked by insurance that was not properly capitalized.
Naked CDS Encourages Widespread Betting on the Subprime Market. To make matters
worse, CDSs were deemed to be so risk-free (and so much in demand) that financial institutions
began to write ―naked‖ CDSs, i.e., offering the guarantee against default to investors who had no
risk in any underlying mortgage backed instruments or CDOs. (Under state insurance law, this
would be considered insuring someone else‘s risk, which is flatly banned.66) Naked CDSs
provided a method to ―short‖ the mortgage lending market without any exposure to its risks. In
other words, these instruments allowed speculators to place the perfectly logical bet for little
consideration (i.e., the relatively small premium) that those who could not afford mortgages
would not pay them off.
The recent suit by the SEC against Goldman Sachs is highly instructive on this point even
leaving to the side the question whether the bank committed fraud as the SEC alleges. The
66
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hedge fund manager, John Paulson, worked with Goldman Sachs (who according to the SEC
charged Paulson a $15 million fee) to select among a series of CDOs those tranches deemed
most likely to lose value. Paulson did not own those tranches. With Goldman‘s help, Paulson just
wanted to find someone who would take the opposite end of his bet, i.e. an institution that was
prepared to bet that the tranches in question – not owned by any party to the bet – would survive
by giving Paulson insurance against those tranches‘ failure. These instruments are called
synthetic CDOs, which are composed of a series of naked CDS on the tranches identified.
Again, leaving aside the question whether Goldman defrauded institutions into taking the
opposite side of the Paulson bet, the concept of lawful betting of billions of dollars on the
question whether a homeowner would default on a mortgage that was not owned by either party,
has had a profound effect on the American public and taxpayers, who became the lender of last
resort to make the winning betters whole.
The Taxpayer Is the Lender of Last Resort to the Bankrupt CDS Casino. In this case,
Paulson won about $1 billion betting that homeowners would default while his counterparties
lost the same amount taking the opposite side of the bet. Because these OTC transactions were
not properly capitalized, the losing counterparties would have collapsed under the strain of
paying these bets; and, because of interconnectedness among financial institutions, any single
collapse of a major financial institution would have destabilized the world wide economy. Only
the intervention of taxpayers as the lender of last resort, stemmed the onset of a worldwide
Depression.
The financial media is filled with reports that the SEC will be bringing further actions
similar to the Goldman case premised upon synthetic CDOs; and private parties are readying
similar cases pursuant to the private rights of action clauses within the securities law.67
The analysis surrounding this subject estimates that there may have been three to four
times as many ―naked‖ CDS instruments extant at the time of the meltdown than CDSs
guaranteeing actual risk.68 This means that to the extent the guarantor of a CDS (e.g., AIG) had
to be rescued by the U.S. taxpayer, the chances were very high that the ―bail out‖ was of failed
naked CDS bets that mortgages would be paid. (Of course, prominent Members of Congress
have maintained that the holders of bets that mortgages would fail have formed a strong political
constituency against the ―rescue‖ of subprime borrowers through the adjustment of mortgages to
keep homeowners from defaulting.69)
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The fact that ―naked‖ CDS and ―synthetic‖ CDOs were nothing more than ―bets‖ on the
viability of the subprime market also demonstrates the importance of the CFMA expressly
preempting state gaming and anti-bucket shop laws.70 Had those laws not been preempted, it is
almost certain that at least some states would have banned these investments as unlicensed
gambling or illegal bucket shops. An action of this sort by even a single state would have
disrupted the ―naked‖ CDS market throughout the country.
Moreover, doubtless because Eric Dinallo, in his then capacity as New York Insurance
Superintendent, seriously considered regulating CDS as insurance71 and because the National
Council of Insurance Legislators are working on a model code to regulate CDS as insurance,72
the financial reform legislation now working its way through Congress would also preempt state
insurance law as it would apply to swaps that are neither cleared or exchange traded.73
Conclusions to Be Drawn about Subprime CDS. It is now common knowledge that:
1. Underwriters of CDSs did not have adequate capital to pay off guarantees as housing
prices plummeted, thereby defying the supposed ―risk free‖ nature of issuing huge
guarantees for the small premiums that were paid.
2. Because CDS were private and bilateral arrangements for which there is no meaningful
―reporting‖ to federal regulators, the triggering of the obligations there under often came
as a ―surprise‖ to both the financial community and government regulators.
3. As the housing market worsened, new CDS obligations were unexpectedly triggered,
creating heightened uncertainty about the viability of financial institutions who had, or
may have had, issued these instruments, thereby leading to the tightening of credit. No
institution could be trusted because there was no transparency as to which institutions
held toxic CDS.
4. The issuance of ―naked‖ CDS increases exponentially the obligations of the CDS
underwriters in that every time a subprime mortgage defaults there is both the real
financial loss and the additional exponential loss derived from failed bets.
5. The securitization structure (including CDS) is present not only in the subprime
mortgage market, but in the prime mortgage market, as well as in commercial real estate,
credit card debt, and auto and student loans. As of this writing, the financial media is
filled with concerns that forfeitures in commercial real estate market will worsen
sufficiently, thereby triggering CDSs and naked CDSs for which will almost certainly be
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insufficient capital to pay the guarantees. This restarts the downward cycle that drove the
country into recession to begin with.74
Interconnectedness: The Systemic Risk Derived from All Types of Swaps
Swaps Other Than CDS Have Caused Serious Financial Dislocations. Moreover, while
CDSs and synthetic CDOs almost certainly lit the fuse that led to the recent explosive financial
destabilization, the remainder of the OTC market has historically led to other destabilizing events
in the economy. These include the recent energy and food commodity bubble,75 the near failure
of LTCM in 1998, the Bankers Trust scandal and the Orange Country bankruptcy of 1994, and
now the causative factor of the European sovereign debt crisis (cross currency swaps masking
the full extent of sovereign debt).76
Unregulated OTC Derivatives of All Kinds Cause “Too Big To Fail.” However, even if
looking only at the financial crisis which is now the focus of this Commission‘s mandate, the
remainder of the unregulated OTC derivatives market was central to the crisis‘ causation. That is
because the remainder of the OTC derivative market relates directly to the interconnectedness
that made large financial institutions ―too big to fail;‖ and the prevention of a cascading collapse
of the financial system therefore required calling upon the American taxpayer to bail out many of
those huge financial entities.
The Lehman Bankruptcy. As now can be seen from the Lehman bankruptcy proceedings,
Lehman was a counterparty or guarantor of over 930,000 OTC derivatives.77 To the extent that
these contracts did not involve CDS, they certainly involved unregulated interest rate, currency,
foreign exchange, and energy swaps.
The Lehman liquidators are now embarked in a huge battle with Lehman‘s OTC
derivative counterparties, claiming that those counterparties have greatly exaggerated the value
of amounts owed by Lehman pursuant to those derivatives. The liquidators have just filed a law
suit against Nomura, which has filed $1 billion in counterparty claims against the Lehman estate.
74
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Lehman asserts that Nomura‘s claims would ―wrongfully extract hundreds of millions of dollars‖
and that ―‗Nomura filed egregious derivative claims against the estate that grossly overstate
actual damages.‘ . . . About 6,000 derivatives claims –totaling $60 bn in losses – were filed
against Lehman‘s US estate . . ., including claims from about 40 of the largest US banks.‖78
Bear Stearns Interconnectedness. As further evidence of the interconnectedness of OTC
derivative counterparties, on April 3, 2008, New York Fed President Timothy Geithner
explained after the Bear Stearns collapse: ―The sudden discovery by Bear‘s derivative
counterparties that important financial positions they had put in place to protect themselves from
financial risk were no longer operative would have triggered substantial further dislocations in
markets. This would have precipitated a rush by Bear‘s counterparties to liquidate the collateral
they held against those positions and to attempt to replicate those positions in already fragile
markets.‖79 Citing this quote, Warren Buffet concluded: ―This is Fedspeak for ‗We stepped in to
avoid a financial chain reaction of unpredictable magnitude.‘ In my opinion, the Fed was right to
do so.‖80
AIG Interconnectedness. Of course, it was the very failure of Lehman, and the cascading
adverse and substantial impacts its bankruptcy has caused, that led the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury to alter course on the day after Lehman‘s failure, and to prevent AIG‘s bankruptcy and
then to recommend the TARP bailout. Those actions revealed to the world the correlation
between interconnectedness of unregulated OTC swaps transactions and the too big to fail
doctrine.
Again, the great portion of the taxpayer funds that went into the front door of AIG to
―save it‖ went out the back door as payments to its derivatives counterparties. As the recent
report of the Congressional Oversight Panel (―COP‖) on the AIG bailout makes clear, billions of
the taxpayer bailout went 100 cents on the dollar to AIG‘s derivatives counterparties.81 In this
regard, COP observed as to AIG‘s derivatives book:
―In the ordinary course of business, the costs of AIG‘s inability to meet its derivative
obligations would have been borne entirely by AIG‘s shareholders and creditors. But
rather than sharing the pain among AIG‘s creditors, the government instead shifted those
costs in full onto taxpayers. The result was the government backed up the entire
derivatives market, as if high-profit, high-risk trading deserved the same taxpayer
backstop as savings deposits and checking accounts. Every counterparty — from pension
funds for retired workers and individual insurance policies, to sophisticated investors and
other financial institutions — received exactly the same deal: a complete rescue at
taxpayer expense.‖82
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The Interconnectedness Problems of Resolution Authority. Of course, the financial
regulation reform bill‘s Title II creates a resolution authority, which allows these complicated
questions of the orderly unwinding of a too big to fail institution to be handled administratively
rather than in a bankruptcy proceeding. However, as Robert Johnson has recently made clear, the
unwinding of the obligations of OTC counterparties may, in the absence of OTC derivative
reform, be far too complex whether it is done by banking regulators or by a court. Johnson has
concluded:
―[W]hen a [too big to fail institution] is in trouble –and there are substantial holdings of
complex and opaque derivatives on the balance sheets of all [such] firms – resolution
authorities have difficulty unraveling web of exposures and valuing them properly. . .
Unfortunately, it is easy to understand why resolution authorities could be induced to
forebear rather than resolve an [too big to fail institution] when they have no clarity about
its structure and patterns of exposures. In such a circumstance, it may be easier to incur
the risk that the insolvent [firm‘s] balance sheet should continue to deteriorate. . . .‖83
All Swaps Are Masked By Opaque Accounting Principles. A final reason all derivatives –
not just credit derivatives – played a role in the onset of the crisis is that they were by virtue of
swaps dealer lobbying never properly accounted for on balance sheets. Because of a major
lobbying effort by ISDA,
―banks and corporations that trade swaps do not play by the same rules as other
individuals and businesses. Banks are permitted to exclude their full exposure to swaps
from their financial statements and instead report only the ―fair value‖ changes n those
swaps over time. Such reporting is like an individual reporting only the change in their
debt balances, instead of reporting the debts themselves.‖84
Thus, prior to the meltdown swaps of all kinds were masked by a double barrier of
opacity, i.e., not only were they private and bilateral, but they were even hidden on the balance
sheets of those institutions most likely to suffer from their adverse impact. This kind of balance
sheet opacity blinded regulators and market observers from the explosive and toxic nature of the
contractual obligations embedded in swaps. And, when the crisis became full blown in
September 2008, this opacity led both the extenders of credit and policy makers to fear the worst.
As a result bank lending froze up, causing the credit crisis.
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Conclusion
By removing the multi-trillion dollar swaps market from the traditional norms of market
regulation, a highly speculative derivative bubble was created that was opaque to federal
regulators and market observers alike. By removing all forms of ensuring the normal capital
adequacy protections of market regulation, the swaps market permitted trillions of dollars of
financial commitments to be made with no assurance that those commitments could be fulfilled
beyond the highly illusory AAA ratings of the counterparties in question.
Had the norms of market regulation been applicable, these swaps transactions would have
been adequately capitalized by traditional clearing norms; and the dangers building up in these
markets would otherwise have been observable by the transparency and price discipline that
accompanies exchange trading.
While the poorly capitalized underwriting of CDS and naked CDS triggered the
meltdown, the crisis was further aggravated by the opaque interconnectedness of large financial
institutions emanating from interest rate, currency, foreign exchange and energy swaps.
Because there was no road map outlining interdependency of those financial transactions,
the worst was feared in the wake of the Bear Stearns, Lehman, AIG, and Merrill dysfunctions.
Institutions became too big to fail because of these uncharted and feared interdependencies; and
the fear that unwinding of these institutions (as proven in the Lehman bankruptcy) would be
hampered by the lack of reliable pricing of the instruments in question.
The darkness of this huge multi-trillion dollar unregulated market not only caused, but
substantially aggravated, the financial crisis. And, the American taxpayer funded the bailouts and
rescued the economy from Depression. The banks are now stronger than ever. The taxpayer,
however, is burdened by high unemployment, job insecurity, depleted pensions, and little access
to credit. We are depending on this Commission to identify correctly the malpractices to ensure
that a fiasco of this nature never happens again.
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